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270 Abstract
The main aim of this paper is to provide a systematic overview of value added 
taxation in Croatia along with main changes in relevant legislation and to esti­
mate total amount of tax expenditures. Results show that the proportion of tax 
expenditures in GDP in Croatia in 2010 amounted to less than 4%, a proportion 
lower than in any of the EU new member states, as well as almost twice as low as 
the EU­27 average. It can be concluded that the Croatian value added taxation 
system is efficient in this way, as was additionally shown by an analysis according 
to which Croatia in 2010 had better efficiency indicators than all the observed EU 
member states. The Croatian VAT system is mainly harmonized with EU directi­
ves, but abolition of the zero rate is still expected; this will increase government 
revenue by approximately 0.4­0.8% of GDP, depending on a chosen scenario. It 
has been suggested that a detailed analysis of the overall value added taxation 
system should be initiated, with the aim of optimizing cost-benefits. The main   
focus should be placed on the determination of the optimal VAT registration thre­
shold, the costs and benefits of the introduced reliefs and exemptions in the tax 
system and the potential effects of the repeal of the zero rate.
Keywords: value added tax (VAT), tax expenditures, efficiency, the Croatian eco­
nomy, European Union
1 introduction 
At the level of consolidated general government, Croatia allocated 39.9% of GDP 
for the financing of public needs in 2010 (Ministry of Finance, 2012). Such heavy 
public consumption requires the provision of sufficient revenues, whose main 
sources are taxes. The tax burden at the level of Croatian general government 
amounted to 33% of GDP in 2010, significantly lower than the European average 
of 39.5% of GDP in 200 (Eurostat, 202a). On the other hand, the tax burden is 
generally heavier in the old than in the new EU member states. Still, the tax bur-
den in Croatia is approximately 2 percentage points higher than the unweighted 
tax burden average of new member states, which amounted to 3.2% of GDP in 
200 (Eurostat, 202a). 
Economic theory generally supports the model based on a heavier reliance on 
consumption tax revenues, which is especially suitable for transition countries. 
Consumption taxation is considered to be simpler and more efficient and is less 
sensitive to inflationary effects. The Croatian taxation model, then, which is based 
on heavier taxation of consumption, should not be changed (Kuliš, 2007a:).   
According to European Commission (200:3), several member states have recen-
tly increased VAT rates, either as a response to the needs for consolidation resul-
ting from the crisis or in the context of a longer-term shift towards indirect rather 
than direct taxation. The latter shift can be rationalised by the relative efficiency 
 The tax burden in this context comprises total tax revenues and social security contributions paid to the state 
at the level of general government budget.p
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27 of consumption taxes, consumption being a broader and more stable base than 
profits and incomes. The broader base allows for lower rates, thereby reducing the 
distortive effects of taxation, with favourable effects on growth and employment 
(European Commission, 200:3).
According to data in financial literature, the idea of turnover taxation by applying 
the value added tax (VAT) appeared for the first time in 1918 or 1919, but it was 
the European Union that had a special importance in the creation and introduction 
of VAT. VAT was gradually introduced in all member states of the European 
Union, and it was soon introduced in some other countries that were not members 
of the EU. Today it is applied as a taxation form of final consumption in all coun-
tries all over the world, except in some federal states, including the United States 
of America (Cindori and Pogačić, 2010:227-228).
The main aim of this paper is to provide a systematic overview of value added 
taxation in Croatia along with the main changes in relevant legislation and, mo-
reover, to estimate the total amount of tax expenditures. Thereby a special empha-
sis will be placed on the determination of the main causes of the size of tax expen-
ditures in VAT and a parallel analysis of Croatian tax expenditures and the effi-
ciency of the VAT system and of those in the EU new member states will be made. 
The results will show that the proportion of tax expenditures in GDP in Croatia in 
200 amounted to less than 4%, a lower proportion than in any of the EU new 
member states, as well as almost twice as low as the EU-27 average. It can be 
concluded that Croatian value added taxation system is efficient in that way, which 
was additionally shown by the analysis according to which Croatia in 200 had 
better efficiency indicators than any of the observed EU member states.
After the introduction, in the second part of the paper the Croatian value added 
taxation system will be described in detail along with all the important changes in 
VAT legislation. The third part of the paper deals with tax expenditures in compa-
rison with EU member states. The fourth part is oriented to a consideration of the 
efficiency of the Croatian VAT system with standard measurements and in compa-
rison with EU member states. This is followed by a conclusion.
2 value added tax in croatia
Until the introduction of value added taxation, consumption in Croatia was taxed 
by the tax on products and services. Numerous tax rates and exemptions led to 
difficulties in the implementation of regulations and control of tax collection, which 
created favourable conditions for tax evasion. From 993 to 995 the number of 
rates of tax on turnover was gradually lowered, which indicated certain prepara-
tions for the introduction of VAT (Kuliš, 2007b:25).
The House of Representatives of the Croatian Parliament at its plenary session 
that took place on 2st June 995 adopted the Value Added Tax Law (OG 47/95), 
while the application of VAT Law was prescribed in detail by the VAT Rules (OG p
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272 60/96). VAT Law should have officially entered into force on 1st January 997. 
Still, by the Law on the Postponement of the Application of the VAT Law official 
application was postponed to st January 998. It was assumed that the introdu-
ction of VAT might cause a possible inflationary effect. However, it in fact caused 
a single increase of prices of only 2.4%, in the first several months of 1998, while 
after only one quarter price levels stabilised. The biggest pressure on citizens’ li-
ving standard after the introduction of VAT arose from the increase in utility sector 
prices, which increased by 2% in Koprivnica, the lowest rise, and by as much as 
31.4% in Bjelovar (Kliment and Dražić Lutilsky, 2005:286).
From the beginning of the official application of VAT, the tax rate was uniform 
and amounted to 22% (Article 0 of VAT Law, OG 47/95). The subject of taxation 
was every delivery of goods or services in the country with compensation, own 
consumption, imported goods, deliveries of goods and services carried out with or 
without compensation or by beneficiary conditions to shareholders and members 
of their closer family, as well as to other recipients, if all other conditions prescri-
bed by the VAT Law were met (Article 2 of the VAT Rules, OG 60/96).
After almost two years of VAT application, a great deal of lobbying from interest 
groups led to the introduction of the zero rate for certain products. Hence, from st 
November 999 the Law concerning Amendments to the VAT Law (Article , OG 
05/99) prescribed a new article that brought in the zero rate for bread, milk, books and 
textbooks, medicines, implants and other medical products of a similar nature (more 
details can be found in Article 4 of the Amendments to the VAT Law, OG 2/99).
From st June 2000 this list was expanded by another Law concerning Amend-
ments to the VAT Law (OG 54/00) to cover scientific and scholarly journals. Other 
tax exemptions were also prescribed (like film screening services), new exemp-
tions on import deliveries and so on. The Law concerning Amendments to the VAT 
Law (OG 73/00) additionally expanded the zero rate to cover certain services: pu-
blic screenings of films, entering into force on 1st September 2000 and organising 
stays paid with transfers from abroad entering into force on st January 200.
The Law concerning Amendments to the VAT Law (OG 90/05) brought in an addi-
tional tax rate of 0% on the provision of accommodation or accommodation with 
breakfast, half board or full board in all types of commercial catering objects, as 
well as on agency fees for the previously stated services with starting date of appli-
cation of st January 2006. From st August 2007 the tax rate of 0% applied also to 
newspapers and magazines published daily and periodically, except on those that 
are fully or mainly filled with advertisement or on those that are used explicitly for 
advertising purposes (Law concerning Amendments to the VAT Law, OG 76/07).
The Law concerning Amendments to the VAT Law (OG 87/09), adopted at a ple-
nary session of the Croatian Parliament on 0th July 2009, with the date of entry 
into force of st January 2010, significantly changed the VAT Law; this was due to p
e
t
a
r
 
s
o
p
e
k
:
t
a
x
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
c
y
 
o
f
 
c
r
o
a
t
i
a
n
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
a
d
d
e
d
 
t
a
x
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
t
h
e
o
r
y
 
a
n
d
 
p
r
a
c
t
i
c
e
3
6
 
(
3
)
 
2
6
9
-
2
9
6
 
(
2
0
1
2
)
273 the harmonisation of Croatian regulations with Council Directive 2/2006/EZ of 
the European Union (for details on executed harmonisation see Vlada RH, 200:3). 
This amendment also included a change from institutional to functional exemp-
tion for banking, financial, insurance and re-insurance services (OG 87/09).
As a consequence of the global economic and fiscal crisis, and with the aim of 
increasing budget revenues, on st August 2009 Croatia started to apply a standard 
VAT rate of 23%, instead of the 22% that had been in force up to that moment 
(Law  concerning Amendments  to  the VAT  Law,  OG  94/09).  Detailed  formal 
application of VAT Law with all amendments was regulated by the VAT Rules 
(OG 49/09) that entered into force on st January 200.
The last amendments of VAT Law at the moment of writing this paper were pre-
scribed by the Law concerning Amendments to the VAT Law (OG 22/2) and in-
clude several significant changes that may be considered important for this rese-
arch. Since st March 202 the standard VAT rate has been increased from 23% to 
25%, while a reduced rate of 0% is applied oils and fats of vegetable of animal 
origin, children’s food and processed food on a basis of cereals for infants and 
small babies, delivery of water, except for a water available in shops in bottles or 
any other packaging, and to white sugar made from either sugar cane or sugar 
beets. Furthermore, this amendment also envisaged application of the reduced rate 
of 0% to the preparation of food and food serving in catering objects, as well as 
serving non-alcoholic beverages, wine and beer in these objects in line with spe-
cial provisions. Moreover, this amendment also prescribed the increase of the VAT 
registration threshold from 85,000 to 230,000 kuna. The latter two amendments 
should enter into force on st January 203.
The importance of VAT revenue as a proportion of general government budget 
revenue and of GDP is illustrated in table .
table 1 
Share of value added tax revenue in total tax revenues of the general government 
budget and in GDP (in billions kuna and in percentages)
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
GDP 208.8 228.9 247.4 266.7 29.0 38.3 345.0 335.2 334.6
General government 
budget revenues
82.9 89.3 96.4 03. 2.3 26.7 34.7 28. 23.7
Total tax revenuesa 75.9 8.3 85.9 9.8 00.6 0.6 20.4 3.6 0.4
VAT revenue 26.0 28. 29.9 32.2 34.9 37.7 4.3 37. 37.7
Share in GDP 2.4 2.3 2. 2. 2.0 .9 2.0 . .3
Share in total revenues 3.3 3.5 3.0 3.3 3. 29.8 30.7 28.9 30.5
Share in tax revenues 34.2 34.6 34.8 35. 34.7 34. 34.3 32.6 34.
a Total tax revenues comprise tax revenues and social security contributions paid to the state at 
the level of general government budget.
Source: Ministry of Finance (2012); author’s calculation.p
e
t
a
r
 
s
o
p
e
k
:
t
a
x
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
c
y
 
o
f
 
c
r
o
a
t
i
a
n
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
a
d
d
e
d
 
t
a
x
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
t
h
e
o
r
y
 
a
n
d
 
p
r
a
c
t
i
c
e
3
6
 
(
3
)
 
2
6
9
-
2
9
6
 
(
2
0
1
2
)
274 Total revenues from VAT in the analysed period 2002-0 amount on average to 
34% of total tax revenue, while the average share in total general government 
budget revenue amounts to 30.7%. Nominally, VAT revenue in the period 2002-0 
increased by 45%, from 26 billion kuna in 2002 to 38 billion in 200. Still, the 
share of VAT revenue in GDP decreased by  percentage point in the observed 
period, mainly as a consequence of significant changes in the VAT Law, as already 
described in this part of the paper. Without any doubt, it can be concluded that 
VAT, along with social security contributions, is the most productive tax of the 
general government budget, covering the largest number of taxpayers2.
3 tax expenditures
Tax expenditures are defined as items in the analysed tax forms which represent a 
loss to the tax revenue of the central government budget, either because they re-
duce the tax base or because they reduce the tax liability (Bratić and Urban, 
2006:33). According to OECD (996:9) tax expenditures are concessions (reliefs) 
that fall outside tax norms or benchmarks. These norms include accounting con-
ventions, the structure of tax rates, the deductibility of compulsory payments, pro-
visions to facilitate tax administration, and norms related to international fiscal 
obligations. Tax expenditures can take a number of forms, including tax exemp-
tions, allowances, credits, deferrals, reliefs, etc. (OECD, 200:2). Tax expenditu-
res are actually an instrument of interventionism which is used by the government 
to favour certain groups or categories of taxpayers (sectors, firms or individuals), 
and to encourage certain economic activities, branches or industries. Thereby the 
government wittingly accepts a decrease in its revenue (Bratić, 2011:40). 
In the VAT system there are in total three reductions of the tax base and one reduc-
tion of the tax liability. Deliveries that reduce the tax base are deliveries not subject 
to taxation, deliveries exempted from taxation and zero-rated deliveries, while de-
liveries rated at the rate of 10% are deliveries that reduce the tax liability. Bratić 
and Urban (2006:72-77) in the analysis of tax expenditures estimate loss of go-
vernment revenue from value added tax exclusively from deliveries rated with 
lower rates, while all other tax exemptions from deliveries in the country, import 
and export deliveries are excluded from the analysis3. In their analysis, they use the 
statistical report on VAT as a relevant source of total amount of deliveries. Table A 
in the appendix shows the amounts of taxable and non-taxable deliveries according 
to the statistical report on VAT (PDV-K, as it is called) in the period 2005-0. It 
should be stressed that data from statistical report PDV-K shown in table A do not 
include the total amount of all deliveries, since these data do not include special 
taxation procedures (exemptions) for small entrepreneurs, or deliveries of different 
2 VAT revenues were up to 2008 the most significant tax revenue of the general government budget (on aver-
age 34.6% of total tax revenue in the period 2002-08). In 2009 and 200, owing to a significant decrease in 
consumption caused by the global financial crisis (and associated VAT revenue decline), social security con-
tributions have become the dominant tax revenue of the general government budget. 
3 Bratić and Urban (2006) elaborate only the zero rate, since at the moment of publishing of their paper the 
rate of 0% had not been introduced. p
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275 subjects that were excluded until 200 due to an institutional exemption. Accor-
ding to the methodology applied in Bratić and Urban (2006:174-177), it is possible 
to calculate loss of revenue from value added tax because of zero-rated deliveries 
and deliveries rated at the rate of 0%, which is shown on table 2.
table 2
Lost value added tax revenue because of zero­rated deliveries and deliveries rated 
at the rate of 10% in the period 2005­10 (in billions kuna)
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010a
Zero-rated deliveries 5.8 4.9 5.4 5.9 5.8 5.9
Taxable deliveries at the rate of 0%   .0 .3 .5 .5 .6
Total 5.8 5.9 6.6 7.4 7.3 7.5
a Preliminary data.
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from table A1 in appendix.
Loss of revenue from VAT due to zero-rated deliveries is calculated as the total 
amount of these deliveries multiplied by the standard VAT rate, while the loss of 
revenue from VAT due to taxable deliveries at the rate of 0% is calculated as the 
amount of these deliveries multiplied by the standard VAT rate and decreased by 
the amount of actually collected revenue at the rate of 0%. Thereby in the period 
2005-08 the standard VAT rate of 22% was used, in 2009 the rate of 22,42% (wei-
ghted average of the rate of 22% for the first 7 months and of 23% for the next 5 
months of 2009) and in 200 the standard VAT rate of 23%. The amount of deli-
veries taxed at reduced rates increased from 26.3 in 2005 to 38 billion kuna in 
200. From table 2 it can be seen that the estimated loss of revenue from VAT due 
to the reduced rates amounted to 5.8 billion kuna in 2005 and rose gradually to 7.5 
billion kuna in 200. Cumulatively, the waiver of the state due to reduced rates in 
the period 2005-0 amounted to 40.5 billion kuna.
Reduced VAT rates are particularly of interest for this analysis. Council Directive 
2/2006/EZ of the European Union (2006:46-47) prescribes the usage of one 
VAT standard rate that must not be lower than 5% and one or two reduced rates, 
but not lower than 5%. This actually means that Croatia is still not harmonized in 
that context with the EU directives. Table 3 shows the list of VAT rates applied in 
EU member states and in Croatia. 
This table with the VAT rates applicable in the EU member states shows the rela-
tively uneven taxation policies among them. Standard VAT rates range from 5% 
in Cyprus and Luxemburg to the highest 27% in Hungary. All the observed coun-
tries, except Denmark, apply at least one reduced VAT rate, while super reduced 
and parking rates are applied in some older EU member states only. Usage of zero 
rate is generally allowed only for export deliveries, since VAT on exported goods 
and services is paid in the land to which they are exported, i.e. in the land in which p
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276 these goods and services are consumed. Still, there are some deviations from this 
rule, so this privilege in an undetermined time period, i.e. “until the final VAT 
system establishment”, is relevant mainly to some old member states that applied 
a zero rate at the time of the adoption of the Council Directive. When it is about 
new member states, the application of a zero rate is allowed only for a limited 
transitional time period. Until the end of 200 Cyprus applied a zero rate to the 
deliveries of particular foodstuffs and beverages, as well as to deliveries of phar-
maceutical products, drugs and vaccines, and Poland was allowed to apply zero 
rate to certain books and specialised periodicals. Malta was entitled to apply a 
zero rate to foodstuffs and pharmaceuticals until  January 200, but according to 
European Commission (202) data, as of  January 202 Malta was still applying 
the zero rate, but will certainly be compelled to repeal this rate in the future.
table 3
VAT rates applied in the EU member states and Croatia, situation at 1st January 2012
Country Standard Reduced Super reduced Parking Zero rate
Belgium 2 6/2   2 Yes
Bulgaria 20 9      
Czech Rep. 20 4      
Denmark 25       Yes
Germany 9 7      
Estonia 20 9      
Greece 23 6.5/3      
Spain 8 8 4    
France 9.6 5.5/7 2.    
Ireland 23 9/3.5 4.8 3.5 Yes
Italy 2 0 4   Yes
Cyprus 5 5/8      
Latvia 22 2      
Lithuania 2 5/9      
Luxembourg 5 6/2 3 2  
Hungary 27 5/8      
Malta 8 5/7     Yes
Netherlands 9 6      
Austria 20 0   2  
Poland 23 5/8      
Portugal 23 6/3   3  
Romania 24 5/9      
Slovenia 20 8.5      
Slovakia 20 0      
Finland 23 9/3     Yes
Sweden 25 6/2     Yes
United Kingdom 20 5     Yes
Croatia 23 0     Yes
Source: European Commission (2012); author’s adjustment.p
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277 Since Croatia will soon join the EU, the abolishment of the zero rate is only the 
question of time. Nestić (2008:27) estimates that in the case of Croatia, products 
on which zero rate has been applied represent about 7.5% of total final household 
consumption and in the case of the introduction of a VAT rate of 0% for those 
products, the price level would increase by approximately 0.8%. By an analogous 
arithmetical estimate we can conclude that the introduction of a VAT rate of 5% 
on products on which the zero rate is currently applied, the increase of the price 
level would amount to approximately 0.4%. It is very likely that it would be only 
a single effect, which should not overflow to other prices and thus should not tend 
to lead to a permanent increase in the inflation rate (Nestić, 2008:27). Figure 1 
shows the general impact of VAT introduction or a VAT rate increase on the level 
of prices.
Figure 1 
Impact of VAT introduction or a VAT rate increase on general price level
Source: Minh Le (2003:47).
According to Minh Le (2003:46-47) in a case in which VAT is revenue-enhancing, 
it will help the government to pursue tight monetary policy, and then VAT may 
even exert a downward pressure on inflation, i.e. in this case VAT is deflationary 
rather than inflationary. Figure 1 shows how the introduction, i.e. VAT rate incre-
ase leads to a once-and-for-all increase in the general price level from P0 to P in 
time period t0. As the government collects more revenues and contracts the money 
supply, the rate of growth of the general price level starts to fall. At moment t 
these two price levels (with and without VAT introduction, i.e. the increase of a 
VAT rate) are equal and after that moment the long-term price level under VAT 
stays below the price line without the introduction of VAT (or without an increase 
in the VAT rate).
It should be emphasised that in Croatia the list of products eligible for the zero rate 
includes only basic goods like bread, milk, books, some medicines and certain 
P
P0
Time
t0 t
 Underlying price line without VAT      Long-term price level under VAT
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278 pharmaceuticals, medical aids, scientific magazines and the public showing of 
films. According to Copenhagen Economics (2007:8), typical price inelastic goods 
are basic goods consumed in larger shares by low income households, while price 
elastic goods typically are luxury goods consumed in larger shares by high income 
households. Hence, it can be concluded that in the case of Croatia the demand is 
price inelastic for the majority of goods that are currently taxed by the zero rate 
and that the increase of VAT rate would probably have just an insignificant effect 
on the total consumption of these goods. In other words, from the data of delive-
ries to which zero rate has been applied (see table A in appendix) it is possible to 
calculate the approximate amount of money that would have flowed into the go-
vernment budget if these deliveries had been taxed at the rate of 5% and 0%. 
Estimated potential VAT revenue in case of applied VAT rates harmonized with 
the EU Council Directive is retroactively calculated for the period 2005-0 and 
the results are shown on table 4. 
table 4 
Potential VAT revenue in the period 2005­10, in case of applied harmonized VAT 
rates with the EU Council Directive
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Value of zero-rated deliveries  
(billions of kuna)
26.3 22.5 24.4 26.6 25.7 25.8
Gross domestic product  
(billions of kuna)
266.7 29.0 38.3 345.0 335.2 334.6
Potential revenue, 5% rate  
(billions of kuna)
.3 . .2 .3 .3 .3
Potential revenue, 0% rate  
(billions of kuna)
2.6 2.2 2.4 2.7 2.6 2.6
Potential revenue, 5% rate (% GDP) 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Potential revenue, 0% rate (% GDP) .0 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from table A1 in appendix.
If Croatia had been applying the VAT rate of 5% in the period from 2005 to 200 
on deliveries taxed at the zero rate, the government would have collected so-
mewhere between . and .3 billion kuna annually, while in case of the applica-
tion of a VAT rate of 0% in the same period, the government would have col-
lected twice as much, i.e. between 2.2 and 2.7 billion kuna annually. Hence it can 
be estimated that upon harmonization of the reduced rates with the EU guidelines 
the government revenue will increase by the amount equal to 0.4% of GDP in case 
of the application of a 5% VAT rate to deliveries that are currently taxed at the zero 
rate, or analogously 0.8% of GDP in case of the application of a VAT rate of 0%. 
From this brief analysis it can be concluded that the share of tax expenditures in 
GDP in Croatia at the moment the zero rates are repealed will decrease by 0.4, or 
0.8 percentage points, depending on the applied reduced rate for deliveries that are 
currently taxed by the zero rate.p
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279 Besides the differences in definition of tax rates in EU member states and Croatia, 
one of the unequal criteria of the VAT system is also the defined registration thre-
shold, i.e. the level of realized turnover in a certain tax period (usually in one year) 
that determines the conditions in which taxpayers (entrepreneurs) are obliged to 
register in the VAT system. Entrepreneurs that become a part of the VAT system 
have to charge VAT on all of their deliveries of goods and services, but have the 
right to deduct VAT that is displayed on their input accounts for acquired goods 
and services.
The level of threshold for VAT registration influences both tax revenues and com-
pliance costs. A threshold that is too high may result in loss of tax revenues for the 
government, because of the non-registration of a certain number of taxable per-
sons for VAT. On the other hand, a threshold that is set too low, leading to a rela-
tively large number of small entrepreneurs participating in the VAT system, con-
siderably burdens the tax administration and increases compliance costs (Kesner-
Škreb and Medak Fell, 2008:2). Keen and Mintz (2004:574) stress that in choo-
sing the optimal threshold for VAT, besides the desires to increase tax revenue and 
reduce administration and compliance costs, one should also take into account the 
minimization of the potential distortions arising from the differential treatment of 
firms above and below the threshold, but there are also links to be made with the 
design of optimal audit strategies. Kim (2005) extends this study by taking into 
account corporate tax evasion behaviour depending on the chosen registration 
threshold. VAT registration thresholds in the new EU member states and Croatia 
applied in September 2011 are shown on figure 2.
Figure 2
VAT registration thresholds in the new EU member states, EU­27 average and 
Croatia (thousands of euro)
Source: European Commission (2011); author’s adjustment.
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280 Croatia with its registration threshold of 85 thousand kuna (equivalent to approxi-
mately .3 thousand euro) is above the minimum prescribed threshold of 5 thou-
sand euro (European Commission, 20), but is still trailing behind the new EU 
member states. It should be noted, however, that a number of new EU member 
states changed their levels of VAT threshold at the time of their accession to the 
EU (Kesner-Škreb and Medak Fell, 2008:2-3).
Also telling of the questionability of the present Croatian VAT registration thre-
shold is the survey elaborated in Dimitrić (2004:361), according to which opi-
nions about the adequacy of this threshold are divided among both enterprises and 
craftsmen. According to this analysis, among tradesmen there is a significant rela-
tionship between standpoints on the question of the VAT registration threshold 
and the size of annual turnover and annual income. More respondents with a lower 
turnover and income consider that this threshold is set too low, which means that 
they prefer to be or to stay outside the VAT system. Since the service industry is 
mostly represented in small trades, and in these trades input VAT is of less signifi-
cance than in industries that are not labour-intensive, this opinion seems quite lo-
gical. To be outside the VAT system brings market competitiveness because lower 
prices can be formed. Besides that, the fact that in this case the input VAT is ac-
tually paid does not have any particular negative impact due to the high share of 
labour in the input structure. Among the interviewed craftsmen there also exists a 
significant and negative relationship between opinion concerning the VAT thre-
shold level of 85,000 kuna and the seasonal characteristics of the craft. Therefore, 
tradesmen whose activities are not seasonal mainly consider that the threshold of 
85,000 kuna is set too low. Seasonal trades are in a privileged position since in the 
season they realize the optimal ratio of inputs and outputs and VAT does not repre-
sent a significant burden to them (Dimitrić, 2004:361). According to already men-
tioned Amendments to the VAT Act (OG 22/2), the Croatian VAT registration 
threshold will be increased to 230 thousand kuna (somewhere in the region of 30.5 
thousand euro) starting from st January 203. This change should favour the ope-
rations of entrepreneurs with lower turnovers and thus reduce their business costs, 
as they will no more be required to determine their tax liabilities or submit the 
legally prescribed tax forms. Taxpayers who wish to stay in the VAT system can 
do so, but are then obliged to remain registered in the VAT system for another 5 
calendar years (Kuliš, 202:4).
Up to now the main focus of this part of the paper was placed on reduced rates and 
the defined VAT registration threshold. It was already mentioned earlier in the text 
that the estimations of tax expenditures in the former part of the paper raise seve-
ral issues primarily due to the data source used (statistical report on VAT – PDV-
K), but also due to non-inclusion of all factors that may have impacted this amount. 
If we abandon these considerations on factors that impact reduction or extension 
of the tax base, the amount of tax expenditures in VAT can be estimated as the 
difference between the VAT tax base multiplied by a standard VAT rate and actu-p
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28 ally collected VAT revenue in a specific year, which can be shown with the fol-
lowing expression:
  TE = B  r – R  ()
where B represents VAT base, r standard VAT rate, and R actually collected VAT 
revenue. The product of the tax base and the standard VAT rate shows the abso- 
lute amount that the government would have collected in a situation in which all 
taxable goods and services were taxed at the uniform tax rate. Still, it has to be 
emphasised that the situation in practice is not as simple as that. Therefore, for the 
purpose of this analysis one important limitation has to be imposed, assuming that 
the application of a uniform VAT rate would not imply any economic distortions 
(like changes of prices, level of consumption, tax evasion and so on).
The main methodological obstacles derive from the absence of publicly available 
data on VAT base. However, the closest assessment of the VAT base is the amount 
of expenditure on final consumption, since the VAT exactly represents a tax on 
final consumption. National accounts contain data on final consumption expendi-
ture (Item P3 of the national accounts). Nevertheless, the figures provided under 
Item P3 in national accounts do not exactly match the theoretical potential VAT 
base, since they measure consumption at market prices, that is, including VAT. 
VAT revenues should therefore be removed from this amount since the theoretical 
basis for taxation should not include the tax itself (OECD, 20:07). In other 
words, it is necessary to transform the equation (), which can be expressed as:
  TE = (FC – R)  r – R  (2)
where FC denotes the amount of final consumption expenditure and all other varia-
bles are denoted as before. According to OECD (2011:107-108), final consumption 
expenditure and VAT base differ in several items and these are: production of non-
market output by the government, imputed rents, tax purchase of dwellings and the 
exemption of financial and insurance services4. Due to limitation of data availabi-
lity in national accounts, the aforementioned adjustments that need to be made in 
order to obtain a more accurate assessment of the theoretical VAT base cannot be 
made within the scope of this paper. Therefore, in all analyses in this paper we used 
final consumption expenditure as an approximation of the theoretical VAT base. 
These discrepancies between the theoretical and such an estimated VAT base can 
obviously generate some errors in calculation, but the estimation of the real magni-
tude of these errors falls outside the scope of this paper. 
Figure 3 shows the estimated share of VAT tax expenditures in the GDP of EU 
new member states, the EU-27 average and Croatia in 200, while total statistics 
4 For a detailed overview on methodology of harmonization of the final consumption expenditure and the 
theoretical VAT base see OECD (20:07-08).p
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282 on VAT tax expenditures in the period 2006-0 are shown in table A2 in appendix. 
For the calculation of VAT tax expenditures defined by the expression (2) and 
shown in table A2 there were used several different sources. For data on final 
consumption expenditure and gross domestic product of all observed EU coun-
tries and Croatia, the Eurostat database has been used (2012b; 2012c). For col-
lected revenues from VAT of EU member states the Eurostat database was used 
(202a), while for Croatia this indicator was available in time series of the Croa-
tian Ministry of Finance (202). Data on VAT rates of the EU member states ac-
cording to different time periods are available in European Commission (202), 
while in case of Croatia the relevant legislation framework was introduced in the 
previous part of the paper that examines VAT in Croatia. Used in the calculation 
of the VAT tax expenditures for a certain year was the average VAT rate in that 
year, calculated as a weighted average of all applied standard rates in that year, 
where weights were chosen in accordance with the duration of application of a 
certain VAT rate. For example, in case of Croatia in 2009 we used the average VAT 
rate of 22.42% calculated by the summation of the standard VAT rate of 22% 
multiplied by 7/12 (since the VAT rate of 22% applied in Croatia in the first seven 
months of 2009) and the standard VAT rate of 23% multiplied by 5/2 (since the 
VAT rate of 23% was applied in the last five months of 2009). 
Figure 3
Estimated tax expenditures of EU new member states, EU­27 average and Croatia 
in 2010 (% of GDP)
Source: Author based on data from table A2 in appendix.
In 200 Croatia recorded a share of tax expenditures in GDP of slightly less than 
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283 (counting Croatia as a new member state), as well as lower than the average of all 
EU member states. Relatively similar shares as in Croatia were recorded in Esto-
nia and Bulgaria, but in the majority of all other countries this share was signifi-
cantly higher. The highest share of tax expenditures in GDP, of almost 9%, was 
recorded in Latvia, followed by Lithuania, Poland and Hungary with the shares of 
approximately 8%. The average of all EU countries was almost twice as high as 
the share of tax expenditures in Croatia, so it can be stated that the Croatian value 
added taxation system is relatively efficient in that manner. 
However, it was already stressed (see figure 2) that the VAT registration threshold 
in Croatia is the lowest compared to all observed countries, which could lead to the 
conclusion that there exists some kind of connection between the VAT registration 
threshold and estimated tax expenditures in VAT. Figure 4 shows a scatter plot of 
the share of VAT tax expenditures in GDP and VAT registration thresholds.
Figure 4
Scatter plot of VAT tax expenditures (% GDP) and VAT registration thresholds
Source: Author’s calculation.
The regression line shows that there exists a positive relationship between the 
prescribed VAT registration thresholds and the share of tax expenditures in GDP. 
Countries with lower VAT thresholds mainly have also lower share of tax expe-
nditures in GDP and vice versa. From the determination coefficient (R2 statistics) 
of 38% it can be concluded that the defined VAT registration threshold is relatively 
important causal factor of the total amount of tax expenditures; this relationship 
may be considered significant up to the significance level of 4.46%5. Therefore it 
5 p-value of F-statistics of the observed model.
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284 is definitely necessary to initiate execution of a detailed analysis of the adequacy 
of the Croatian VAT registration threshold with the aim of optimization of the 
costs and benefits of the added value taxation system. Besides the VAT registra-
tion threshold, some other factors, like reduced rates and exemptions, also defini-
tely have an important effect on total VAT tax expenditures. However, their con-
tribution to total amount of VAT tax expenditures is almost impossible to quantify 
in this kind of analysis.
4 eFFiciency oF value added tax
There is no generally accepted opinion on what is an efficient VAT system or what 
it should look like, but most controversies connected to VAT efficiency definitely 
refer to the application of different taxation rates. The Copenhagen Economics 
study (2007:4) stresses that uniform rates are a superior instrument to maintain a 
high degree of economic efficiency, to minimise otherwise substantial compliance 
costs and to smooth the functioning of the internal market. On the other hand, the 
use of reduced rates as a policy instrument is often advocated notably for health, 
cultural and environmental reasons to provide easier and more equal access to 
educational and cultural content and incentives for eco-innovation and know-
ledge-based resource efficient growth (European Commission, 2010:14-15). Ta-
xation by the uniform tax rate is definitely more often represented by tax experts 
that consider that VAT should achieve exclusively fiscal and economic goals, whi-
le individuals who consider that VAT should also achieve some social goals usual-
ly vote for larger number of tax rates. Arguments for and against the uniform VAT 
tax rate are shown in table 5.
table 5
Arguments for and against the uniform VAT rate
Reason Arguments for the  
uniform VAT rate
Arguments against the  
uniform VAT rate
Regressiveness
The  concept  of  regressiveness  is 
hard to define unambiguously, since 
it  is  not  a  matter  of  indifference 
which base one looks at – income or 
consumption, or to which period the 
observation  relates.  However,  any 
possible  regressiveness  should  be 
corrected by social transfers or by 
progressiveness of other taxes.
The term regressiveness is usu-
ally linked to annual income, 
so  a  single  rate  VAT  system 
burdens the impoverished mo-
re, i.e. it generates unfavourab-
le social effects.
Tax  
administration
The introduction of several tax rates 
requires a detailed definition of tax-
able products, complicates tax admi-
nistration and leads to an increase 
of  the  administrative  costs  com-
pared  to  a  system  with  uniform 
rate.
Taxation costs do not depend 
on number of rates only, so that 
technical  aspect  should  not 
have any impact on decision-
ing  on  number  of  rates  and 
taxation policy.p
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285 Reason Arguments for the  
uniform VAT rate
Arguments against the  
uniform VAT rate
Tax evasion
Taxpayers  will  attempt  to  put  all 
products that are not unequivocally 
defined  in  lower  rate  categories, 
which opens the door to corruption 
and lobbying, as well as to tax eva-
sion.
Lower  tax  rates  (and  conse-
quently lower prices) may have 
an impact on decisions of cer-
tain  groups  of  consumers  to 
stop spending in the informal 
economy  (for  example  in  the 
case of construction or miscel-
laneous repairs).
Prices
Lower VAT rates are not a guaran-
tee of lower prices. In a free market, 
prices are formed according to sup-
ply and demand. Traders set their 
prices according to the elasticity of 
demand, that is, according to what 
the market will bear, irrespective of 
the rate of taxation.
Lowering the VAT rates on cer-
tain products/services definite-
ly  leads  to  the  lowering  of 
prices on those products/serv-
ices, and especially in business 
activities  with  pronounced 
competitiveness.
Consumer  
preferences
Various rates of VAT lead to distor-
tions of consumer preferences and 
the absence of the neutrality princi-
ple. For example, taxation of luxury 
products at higher rates will disco-
urage the impoverished from occa-
sionally  upgrading  their  consu-
mption with more expensive prod-
ucts.
It is acceptable to allow some 
key  sectors  to  apply  reduced 
rates  for  certain  products  or 
services in order to foster eco-
nomic growth and competitive-
ness.  Application  of  reduced 
rates is often requested in the 
tourism  sector,  arguing  that 
tourism will be in unfavourable 
position with regard to foreign 
competition where tourist servi-
ces are taxed by lower rates.
Budget  
revenue
Lower  VAT  rates  mean  lower  
government budget revenues.
Loss  of  government  revenue 
due to introduction of reduced 
or zero rates could be mitigated 
by  increased  consumption  or 
increase  of  some  other  taxes 
(e.g. excise duties).
Source: Author based on Kesner­Škreb (1999), Copenhagen Economics (2007), Kuliš (2007a), 
Cindori and Pogačić (2010).
Another very important issue in the value added taxation system is linked to tax 
exemptions. Tax exemptions are classified in three groups: exemptions in the coun-
try, export and import exemptions. All exemptions in the country are without the 
right of deduction of input tax, while export products are exempted from payment 
of the VAT, due to the destination principle, but with the right to deduct tax calcu-
lated in their inputs (Kuliš, 2007b:29). Lejeune (20:274) stresses that the EU 
VAT system has a relatively narrow tax base because of the prevalence of these p
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286 exemptions without a right of deduction6. However, where the input deduction is 
denied, the non-deductible VAT becomes a cost to the provider of the supplies of 
goods or services. That cost is then passed on to the consumers in a phenomenon 
referred to as cascading. Hence, VAT exemptions create distortions and uncertainty 
and keep the VAT system from being broad-based and neutral to business. On the 
other hand, regressiveness is not solved efficiently because these measures do not 
target low-income wage earners. Therefore, the prevalence of such VAT exemp-
tions cannot be considered the best practice. Besides that, much litigation has ari-
sen due to the wide range of exemptions and different interpretations by EU mem-
ber states regarding the criteria for determining whether a transaction is subject to 
an exemption. From 2000 to 2009, 57 of 204 VAT cases (28%) referred to the Eu-
ropean Court of Justice involved an exemption matter (Lejeune, 20:274).
Exemptions are contrary to the principle of VAT as a broad-based tax. The conti-
nued relevance of many of the existing exemptions is questionable. Broadening 
the tax base by reducing the number of exemptions makes the tax more efficient 
and more neutral and offers a valid alternative to increasing VAT rates (European 
Commission, 2010:10). Bratić and Urban (2006:152) also agreed that the various 
exemptions and tax privileges complicate the tax system, increase the costs of tax 
collection and open up windows for tax evasion. Hence, it is absolutely necessary 
to make an analysis of the costs and benefits of the introduction of any form of tax 
expenditure into the existing tax system before their introduction. This is additio-
nally proven by the recorded increasing trend of such analyses among different 
countries that tend to calculate costs and benefits of introduced reliefs and exemp-
tions in the tax system which narrow the tax base or reduce the obligation of 
paying the tax (Bratić, 2011:39). Evaluation of tax measures refers to a policy 
review that assesses the performance of tax measures according to the following 
three criteria: relevance, effectiveness and efficiency. A relevance review answers 
the question whether the tax measure is consistent with policy priorities, and if it 
realistically addresses an actual need. An effectiveness review should provide an 
answer to the question whether a tax measure is meeting its objectives effectively, 
within budget, and without unwanted outcomes. An efficiency review answers the 
question whether the tax measure is the most appropriate and efficient means to 
achieve objectives, as compared to alternative design and delivery approaches 
(Lenjosek, 2004:9).
Since there is no clear idea of an efficient VAT system, it is impossible to determine 
a precise measure of VAT efficiency. In this part of the paper the most often used 
three measures of the VAT efficiency will be elaborated, along with all their advan-
tages and disadvantages. Ebrill et al. (2001:40-42) define two measures of effi-
ciency of the VAT revenue collection system and these are efficiency ratio (ER) 
and C-efficiency ratio (CER).
6 This also relates to VAT in Croatia since the Croatian VAT system is almost completely harmonized with 
the European system.p
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287 The efficiency ratio or the productivity ratio of VAT is defined with the following 
expression:
  ER =   
R
Y  r 00  (3)
where R denotes actually collected VAT revenue, Y denotes nominal GDP, and r 
standard VAT rate. The efficiency ratio shows what percent of GDP each percen-
tage point of the standard VAT rate collects. However, this measure may be mi-
sleading since in principle VAT taxes consumption and not production, while GDP 
measures production and not consumption (Bird and Gendron, 2006:). Thus the 
perfect efficiency ratio of 100% would be achieved only in case of the application 
of the uniform rate on production-type VAT (which is not applicable in our case 
since all EU countries, as well as Croatia, use the consumption-type VAT) and 
statistics would also be vitiated by the errors in GDP measurement (Ebrill et al., 
2001:41). These issues can be easily bypassed by using the C-efficiency ratio, 
which substitutes consumption for GDP, and which can be expressed with the 
following formula: 
 
CER =   
R
FC  r
00
 
(4)
where R denotes actually collected VAT revenue, FC final consumption expenditu-
res, and r standard VAT rate. As before, perfect C-efficiency ratio of 100% would be 
achieved only in the case of the application of a uniform rate, while in the case of the 
application of a zero rate or reduced rates of VAT on certain goods and services, the 
C-efficiency ratio would drop under 100 percent. On the other hand, the inclusion of 
investment in the VAT base, or a break in the VAT chain resulting in the taxation both 
of final consumption and some of the constituent intermediate goods, will tend to 
result in C-efficiency of over 100 percent (Ebrill et al., 200:4-42).
Theoretically, a taxation system could be considered fully efficient in a case in 
which it covers the whole tax base (final consumption expenditure) by the uniform 
rate and when the tax administration manages to collect the whole tax liability. 
According to OECD (20:06-3), one relatively appropriate indicator for that 
purpose is the VAT Revenue Ratio (VRR). VRR measures the difference between 
actually collected VAT revenues and revenues that could be theoretically collected 
in the case in which the whole VAT tax base is levied at a uniform tax rate, which 
can be shown with the following expression:
  VRR =   
R
B  r
00  (5)
where R denotes actually collected VAT revenue, B VAT tax base, and r standard 
VAT rate. As already elaborated in the text, a very good approximation of a VAT 
tax base can be expressed as the difference between the final consumption expen-
diture and actually collected VAT revenues. Thus, it is necessary to transform ex-
pression (5), as shown by the following equation:p
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VRR =    R
(FC – R)  r
00  (6)
where FC represents the amount of final consumption expenditure, and all other 
variables are denoted the same way as before. All three VAT efficiency indicators 
of EU new member states and Croatia in 2010 are demonstrated in figure 5, while 
total statistics on each and separate efficiency indicator in the period 2006-10 are 
available in tables A3, A4 and A5 in appendix.
Figure 5
VAT efficiency indicators in Croatia and EU new member states in 2010
Source: Author based on tables A3, A4 and A5 from appendix.
Croatia had in 2010 the best efficiency indicators of all observed EU member 
states, which means that Croatian value added taxation system may be considered 
more efficient than that of any of the observed EU countries. According to VAT 
system efficiency, Croatia is followed by Estonia and Bulgaria, while Latvia is 
considered the least efficient of all the observed countries. It should be emphasi-
sed that these results are expected, according to the estimated share of tax expen-
ditures in GDP, which is visible on figure 3, and which is directly linked to VAT 
system efficiency. However, from the definitions of all three efficiency indicators, 
disadvantages due to which they should be interpreted with a special attention can 
be observed. Namely, none of the administrative, compliance and taxpayer costs 
that are indirectly linked to VAT efficiency are represented in any of the observed 
efficiency measures7. Besides that, these measures do not tackle possible econo-
mic distortions caused by the nature of these taxes.
7 For details regarding the tax authorities costs (administrative costs of taxation) see for instance Bratić and 
Pitarević (2004), and for costs of taxpayers see Blažić (2004).
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289 5 conclusion
Value added tax in Croatia, along with social security contributions, is the most 
important tax revenue in the general government budget and covers the largest 
number of taxpayers. Total revenues from VAT in the analysed period 2002-0 
amount on average to 34% of total tax revenue, while the average share of VAT 
revenue in total general government budget revenue amounts to 30.7%. Since the 
beginning of VAT application, the taxation system has experienced significant mo-
difications primarily related to changes of VAT rates, exemptions, registration 
threshold, etc. VAT is currently mainly compliant with European guidelines, while 
some minor harmonisations are expected up to the moment of Croatian accession 
to the EU, primarily related to abolishment of the zero rate. Since Croatia will be 
obligated to abolish the currently applied zero rate on some products, this paper 
estimated the effect of such changes on the Croatian budget. Analysis shows that 
government revenue will increase by an amount equal to 0.4% of GDP in the case 
of the application of the lowest prescribed VAT rate of 5% on deliveries that are 
currently taxed at the zero rate, or analogously 0.8% of GDP in case of application 
of a VAT rate of 0%. It can be concluded that the share of tax expenditures in 
GDP in Croatia at the moment of the abolishment of zero rates will also decrease 
by the same amount, i.e. 0.4 or 0.8 percentage points, depending on the applied 
reduced rate.
From 2005 to 200 the amount of all deliveries not subject to taxation, exempted 
from taxation and taxed at the reduced rates increased by 90%, from 09 to 208 
billion kuna. From that amount, deliveries taxed at the reduced rates increased 
from 26.3 in 2005 to 38 billion kuna in 200. Estimated loss of VAT revenues due 
to reduced rates is treated as a tax expenditure and was estimated at 5.8 billion 
kuna in 2005, gradually rising to 7.5 billion kuna in 200. Cumulatively, revenue 
foregone by the state due to reduced rates in the period 2005-0 amounted to 40.5 
billion kuna. 
Estimates show that the proportion of tax expenditures in GDP in Croatia in 200 
amounted to less than 4%, a proportion lower than that experienced in any of the 
EU new member states, and almost twice as low as the EU-27 average. It can be 
concluded that Croatian value added taxation system is relatively efficient in that 
way, which was additionally shown in the efficiency analysis according to which 
in 2010 Croatia had a better efficiency indicator than any of the observed EU 
member states. 
However, in the whole analysis of VAT system efficiency no analyses of the total 
costs of tax authorities, i.e. administrative and compliance costs of taxation, the 
costs of taxpayers, as well as other costs induced by economic distortions genera-
ted by the nature of these taxes were included. Therefore, it is absolutely nece-
ssary to initiate a detailed analysis of the whole value added taxation system with 
the aim of the optimization of costs and benefits. This analysis should at least en-p
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290 compass determination of the optimal VAT registration threshold, costs and bene-
fits of introduced reliefs and exemptions in the taxation system, which narrow the 
tax base or reduce the tax liability and all the potential effects of the repeal of the 
zero rate on all participants that will be directly or indirectly affected by these 
changes. All introduced reliefs and exemptions that impact the level of tax expen-
ditures in Croatian VAT system should be closely monitored and evaluated by 
their relevance, effectiveness and efficiency in order to achieve the best practice 
VAT model. Thus, further research in Croatia should be focused on a broader con-
cept of the value added taxation system, one that also covers the different costs of 
taxation, as well as all the potential implications to economic growth and market 
competitiveness.p
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29 appendix
table a1
PDV­K statistical report, nominal amounts (in billions kuna)
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010a
Deliveries – total (+2) 562. 634.8 702.2 762.5 666.2 69.3
)   Deliveries not subject to taxation and 
exempted deliveries – total (a+b+c)
09.2 9.6 34.2 44.4 25.8 95.7
  a) Deliveries not subject to taxation 24.4 27.8 30.9 33.5 27.8 29.8
  b) Deliveries exempted from taxation 58.5 69.4 78.8 84.4 72.2 40.
  b)   of which: Export deliveries – with 
the right to deduct input tax
56. 64.5 72.6 78. 66. 74.6
  b)   of which: Deliveries in the country 
– without right of deduction of 
input tax
2.4 2.6 2.5 2.5 3.0 59.7
  c) Zero-rated deliveries 26.3 22.5 24.4 26.6 25.7 25.8
2) Taxable deliveries – total (2a+2b+2c) 453.0 55. 568. 68. 540.4 495.6
  2a) Taxable deliveries at the rate of 0%   8.2 0.4 2.6 2. 2.2
  2b) Taxable deliveries at the rate of 22% 453.0 506.9 557.7 605.5 307.0 -.7
  2c) Taxable deliveries at the rate of 23%         22.4 485.
a Preliminary data.
Source: Central Office, Tax Administration, Ministry of Finance; author’s adjustment.
table a2
Estimate of tax expenditures in Croatia, new member states and EU­27 average in 
the period 2006­10 (% GDP)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
EU-27a 6.3 6.5 6.8 7.3 7.3
Bulgaria 4.2 4.7 3.5 5. 4.3
Czech Rep. 5.6 5.3 5.0 5.4 6.0
Estonia 2.2 2.3 3.9 3.8 4.
Latvia 4.7 4.7 6.9 9.8 8.9
Lithuania 6.2 5.2 5.9 9. 8.2
Hungary 6.2 5.7 5.9 6.9 7.9
Poland 7.8 7. 7.8 8.4 8.2
Romania 6.8 6. 6. 7.4 7.5
Slovenia 4. 3.8 4. 5. 5.2
Slovakia 5.6 5.9 6.0 7.4 7.2
Croatia 2.4 2.7 2.5 3.7 3.9
a For EU­27 standard rate was used as a weighted average of all members’ standard rates, where 
weights of each country were determined by the amount of final consumption expenditures.
Source: Author’s calculation.p
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292 table a3 
Efficiency rate in Croatia, new member states and EU-27 average in the period 
2006­10
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
EU-27a 37.5 36.7 36.0 35.3 36.0
Bulgaria 53.5 5.8 54.5 45.2 46.
Czech Rep. 33.6 33.4 35.6 36.4 34.9
Estonia 50.4 49.2 43.9 46.5 43.9
Latvia 47.7 45.8 37.3 28.5 3.6
Lithuania 42. 45.0 44.4 37.5 37.7
Hungary 38.0 40.3 39.0 38.0 34.8
Poland 37.0 37.9 36.4 33.8 35.3
Romania 4.7 42.5 4.6 35.0 36.2
Slovenia 42.6 42.3 42.5 42.3 42.5
Slovakia 39.3 35.5 36.3 35.3 33.4
Croatia 54.6 53.9 54.4 49.3 49.0
a For EU­27 standard rate was used as a weighted average of all members’ standard rates, where 
weights of each country were determined by the amount of final consumption expenditures.
Source: Author’s calculation.
table a4
C-efficiency rate in Croatia, new member states and EU-27 average in the period 
2006­10
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
EU-27a 47.8 47.4 46.0 43.7 44.7
Bulgaria 62.7 60.5 65.7 56.8 59.9
Czech Rep. 48.4 49.4 5.9 50.6 48.7
Estonia 70.4 69.7 59.6 6.6 60.2
Latvia 57.9 57. 45.2 35.2 39.2
Lithuania 50.0 54.9 52.3 4. 44.4
Hungary 49.5 52.5 5.3 49.3 46.3
Poland 45.8 48.3 45.5 42.4 44.0
Romania 48.7 5.3 50.8 43.3 45.9
Slovenia 59.5 60.6 59.6 55.6 55.4
Slovakia 5.7 48.5 48.6 43.6 42.9
Croatia 70.3 68.9 70.2 64. 63.5
a For EU­27 standard rate was used as a weighted average of all members’ standard rates, where 
weights of each country were determined by the amount of final consumption expenditures.
Source: Author’s calculation.p
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293 table a5
VAT revenue rate in Croatia, new member states and EU­27 average in the period 
2006­10
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
EU-27a 52.4 52.2 50.5 47.6 49.0
Bulgaria 7.6 68.9 75.6 64. 68.0
Czech Rep. 53.3 54.5 57.5 56.0 53.9
Estonia 80.7 79.7 66.8 69.8 68.5
Latvia 64.6 63.7 49.2 38.0 42.8
Lithuania 55.0 60.9 57.7 44.8 49.0
Hungary 55.0 58.7 57. 55.4 52.4
Poland 50.9 54. 50.6 46.8 48.7
Romania 53.7 56.8 56.3 47.2 50.9
Slovenia 67.6 69.0 67.6 62.5 62.3
Slovakia 57.3 53.4 53.6 47.6 46.7
Croatia 83. 8.3 83.0 74.9 74.4
a For EU­27 standard rate was used as a weighted average of all members’ standard rates, where 
weights of each country were determined by the amount of final consumption expenditures.
Source: Author’s calculation.p
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